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CANADIAN-SOVIET TRADE-
IS THERE MORE IN IT FOR CANADA? 
Patrick W. Brophy 
Introduction and Overview 
The Soviet Union is becoming an increas-
ingly important trading partner of Canada. Be-
hind the United States, Japan, and Great Britain, 
the USSR was the fourth largest importer of 
Canadian goods and services in 1985 (Exports 
Merchandise Trade 1985, pp. 6-21). From 1975 
to 1982, the nominal value of Canadian exports 
(f.o.b.) . to the Soviet Union grew from $400 
million (U.S.) to $1,666 million. However, the 
value of Canadian exports peaked in 1982 and 
declined to $1,164 million in 1985 (Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1982 and 1986). 
Several important questions must be ad-
dressed when examining Canadian -Soviet trade. 
Are there unexploited opportunities in the 
Soviet market for Canadian business, and is 
Canadian business effectively competing for 
these markets? To what extent do political con-
siderations, notably Mghanistan, affect Cana-
dian-Soviet trade relations? What efforts are 
being made and what efforts should Canada be 
making to provide services to Soviet Foreign 
Trade Organizations (FTOs, the Soviet trading 
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monopolies)? Is Canadian policy at least partly 
responsible for the recent decline in exports to 
the Soviets? 
Although the Canadian trade surplus with 
the Soviets remains large, Canada can do bet-
ter. When it comes to trading with the world's 
third-largest economy, Canada does not have 
the experience of countries like West Germany, 
the Soviet's largest trading partner. Perhaps 
the major problem in this case is a lack of infor-
mation about Canadian products in the Soviet 
Union. Peter Dennis, the importer of Soviet-
built Lada cars into Canada who also exports 
Canadian heavy equipment to the Russians, 
offers an example of this problem. A Soviet pro 
duction line was recently built with 90 robots 
from the U.S.; Canada has robotics (witness the 
Canadian flag on the mechanical arm of the 
U.S. space shuttle), but the people at the plant 
told Dennis that they "didn't know we made ro-
botics" (Walker, p. 58). 
The fallout from the Soviet invasion of 
Mghanistan dominated trade in the years fol-
lowing the invasion, to the benefit of Canadian 
farmers but to the detriment of industrial ex-
porters. In the years immediately prior to the 
invasion (1975-79) annual exports to the USSR 
rose steadily from US$ 400 million to US$ 646 
million. In the year following the invasion, 
however, exports more than doubled to US$ 
1,303 million. This increase was achieved al-
most completely through grain exports (Brown, 
p. 32). 
At first glance, the Canadian and Soviet 
economies appear to be more competitive rather 
than complementary. Both rely heavily on ex-
ports of natural resources. In 1985, only about 
42% of Canada's total exports were in finished 
products such as industrial machinery, trans-
portation equipment, and office equipment. 
There is, however, an opportunity for further 
mutually beneficial trade. An improved flow of 
information, facilitated by government action, 
could measurably improve the volume and value 
of Canadian exports to the USSR Developing 
competitive skills for trading with controlled 
economies will also advance Canadian interests. 
The purpose to this paper is to investigate 
whether Canada can reap greater benefits, such 
as increased net exports and employment, from 
its trade with the USSR, and how any such 
benefits might be realized. This paper will con-
centrate on the federal government, although 
the provincial governments are also involved 
in the competition for Soviet markets. The 
reader should keep in mind that there is a high 
degree of extraterritorial legal and managerial 
control over Canadian industry, which most 
likely will not be a positive factor in any Cana-
dian government efforts to achieve greater ex-
ports to the Soviets. Canadian government and 
industry should be aware that there are great 
risks, both political and economic, involved in 
pursuing Soviet trade opportunities. These risks 
have been outlined in the related literature and 
are not the focus of this paper. 
The Soviet Union and Its Needs 
What are the opportunities for Canada in 
the Soviet market for Canadian goods and serv-
ices? These can be deduced by comparing actual 
Soviet economic results with the designs of 
Soviet planners and observing where the es-
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sential weaknesses are. Such an analysis will 
show three basic types of opportunities. The 
first type consists of Soviet shortages. These 
are simply differences between actual and 
planned production and are shortrun needs. 
The other two types of opportunities pertain to 
facility development and national economic 
development (Hoyt, p. 53). Facility develop-
ment concerns the modernization and im-
provement of existing plants, while national 
economic development deals with changes in 
the make-up of the economy's output. Both 
development needs are of a long term nature. 
Discovering the latter two types of oppor-
tunities requires an in-depth analysis of the 
Soviet economy. Making the most of either of 
these opportunities requires a close working 
relationship between the appropriate Soviet 
trade officials and Canadian business and gov-
ernment leaders. 
Table 1 reveals the existence of a number 
of opportunities of all three kinds for Canadian 
business. In each of the Soviet industries listed 
in Table 1 (except machinery), the rate of growth 
of total productivity in 1981-82 was negative. 
Machinery, the industry in which Gorbachev 
intends to focus most of his development efforts, 
suffered a serious decline in the rate of growth 
of productivity of its capital. These produc-
tivity declines were not short-term unexpected 
disappointments to the Soviets but, in fact, are 
representative of a substantial downward trend 
in the productivity of Soviet iqdustry in general. 
Short-Term Soviet Needs Resulting 
From Shortages 
Recent analysis of the Soviet economy 
has revealed the critical role which shortages 
have played in these disappointing Soviet pro-
ductivity figures, the effect of which is magni-
fied by a type of "chain reaction" throughout 
the economy. For instance, shortages of iron 
ore and scrap metal have hampered steel pro-
duction, which in tum has curtailed the growth 
of machinery production, consequently affect-
ing investment throughout the economy. 
Shortages of timber and non-metallic minerals 
have not only aggravated the investment prob-
lems caused by steel shortages, but have also 
affected other sectors as well. The mineral 
Table 1 
Rates of Growth of Productivity 
(Labor, Capital, and Total Productivity) 
of Select Soviet Industries in 1981-82 
Industry 
1) Ferrous metals 
2) Non-ferrous metals 
3) Electric power 
4) Machinery 
5) Chemicals 
6) Wood, pulp, and paper 
7) Construction materials 
8) Light industry 
9) Food processing 
Labor 
-0.5 
1.0 
0.8 
3.3 
2.4 
1.4 
0.1 
1.1 
2.4 
Capital 
-5.3 
-5.5 
-2.7 
-4.6 
-5.4 
-4.9 
-4.2 
-5.4 
-3.2 
Total 
-3.2 
-2.5 
-2.0 
0.7 
-1.6 
-0.8 
-1.4 
-1.0 
-0.3 
Source: Schroeder, G.E., "The Slowdown in Soviet Industry, 1976-82," 
Soviet Economy, January-March 1985. 
shortage, for example, has hampered the chem-
icals industry, thus curtailing production in 
areas such as textiles and agriculture (Schroeder, 
pp. 52, 56). 
Canada has the resources to fill many of 
the shortages in the Soviet economy as will be 
seen in a later section. As Canada competes for 
opportunities in the Soviet market created by 
shortages, it should be impressed on the Soviets 
that the faster these resource gaps are filled, 
the more productive the Soviet economy will 
be as a whole. This is critical because ulti-
mately the USSR will need hard-currency earn-
ings to pay for Canadian goods, and the Soviet's 
hard-currency supply is in tum highly depend-
ent on its productivity. 
Long Term Development Needs 
There are many opportunities for Cana-
dian firms to meet Soviet facility development 
needs. According to the Twelfth Five Year Plan, 
modernization of Soviet facilities is to be 
achieved primarily through the renovation of 
old plant and equipment rather than through 
new construction. If such investment in facil-
ity development is to be successful, the Soviets 
must import some advanced technology (Hewett 
et al., p. 10). Some areas of facility development 
which are particularly likely to offer oppor-
tunities to Canadian suppliers are energy and 
mining. The investment required to extract 
one ruble's worth of raw materials has increased 
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by four times since 1960. Furthermore, the 
highest quality coal and ores have already been 
extracted, so the Soviets will need to invest 
more in initial process operations in order to 
make use of their declining resources. 
Machinery building and metal working 
(MBMW) are two areas where Canadian firms 
might be able to fill long term Soviet national 
economic development needs. In fact, MBMW 
is the primary focus of Gorbachev's plan for 
modernization. In 1985, a new Soviet bureau 
was formed to control the eleven machine 
building ministries. The creation of this bur-
eau not only emphasizes the importance Gor-
bachev is placing on this sector, but may also 
offer Canada an efficient means of marketing 
machinery plant and equipment to the Soviets. 
In June, 1985, Gorbachev called for MBMW 
investment to increase by a factor of 1.8 to 2.0. 
An increase of this magnitude is all the more 
noteworthy since as of 1985, MBMW invest-
ment already accounts for 24% of industrial 
investment and 8.6% of total investment. By 
his pronouncement Gorbachev has implied that 
investment in agriculture and energy will 
therefore be sacrificed to pay the higher invest-
ment bills of MBMW. Agriculture and energy 
are already two undependable sectors of the 
Soviet economy, and diverting investment away 
from these sectors is likely to induce further 
shortages. These shortages, especially in en-
ergy, will in tum have spillover effects which 
Table 2 
Average Capacity Utilization Rates for Selected Canadian Industries in 1985 
Chemical and Chemical Products ..................................................... 62.3% 
Durable Goods .................................................................... 80.3% 
Machinery ........................................................................ 65.2% 
Electrical and Electronic Products ............................................. · ....... 76.8% 
Petroleum and Coal Products ........................................................ 63.5% 
Wood ...................................................................... · ...... 79.3% 
Paper and Allied Products ........................................................... 82.9% 
Rubber Products .................................................................. 79.3% 
Plastic Products ................................................................... 98.5% 
Primary Metal ..................................................................... 75.3% 
Fabricated Metal Products ........................................................... 82.1% 
Food ............................................................................ 79.9% 
Total Manufacturing ............................................................... 78.1% 
Source: Statistics Canada, "Capacity Utilization Rates in Manufacturing," 
Second Quarter 1986, pp. 48-52. 
will affect the rest of Soviet industry (including 
MBMW). Gorbachev's ambitious plan may in-
deed require increased imports for all three of 
these sectors, and Canada should be position-
ing herself to take advantage of this. When the 
need to import arises, Soviet officials should 
know that accessible Canadian business and 
government leaders can be depended on to pro-
vide competitive, high quality products and 
services. Competitive financing, currently a 
Canadian shortcoming, should also be among 
these services. 
Canada's Ability to Meet Soviet Needs 
One way of determining the most profit-
able opportunities for Canada is by comparing 
weak sectors of the Soviet economy with the 
strengths of the relevant Canadian export in-
dustries. Nine troubled sectors of the Soviet 
economy were pointed out earlier in Table 1. In 
each of these sectors except for perhaps elec-
tricity (where overwhelming technological 
constraints exist), Canada has the ability to 
remedy Soviet shortages. Actually, depending 
on the cause of the Soviet electrical shortage 
(e.g., lack of suitable fuel), Canada may even be 
in a strong position to help in this industry, 
too. As Table 2 shows, Canada has surplus 
capacity in several industries related to the 
nine Soviet sectors noted earlier and can there-
by reduce its surplus capacity problems by in-
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creasing exports to the USSR Certainly Cana-
dian industry has shown that it is capable of 
exporting to the rest of the world the types of 
products and services for which the Soviets 
may be in the market. For instance, total do-
mestic exports of iron ores and concentrates in 
1985 were approximately $1.2 billion (Cana-
dian),and exports of fabricated ferrous metals 
were almost $2.4 billion. Exports of non-fer-
rous fabricated metals were valued at $5.9 billion. 
Exports of all industrial machinery totalled 
nearly $3.1 billion. Many other Canadian in-
dustries which could meet Soviet needs also 
show similarly strong export totals. 
The Canadian Government Role 
Now that it has been shown that the USSR 
has economic needs in at least nine sectors 
that Canadian industry is capable of providing 
for, what can the Canadian government do to 
tum this situation to the advantage of Cana-
dian industry? There are numerous changes 
which Canada could initiate to make its indus-
tries more competitive not only for the Soviet 
market but for other worldwide markets as well. 
However, general suggestions of this nature 
are beyond the scope of this study. What fol-
lows in this section is an examination of vari-
ous public agencies which affect Canadian-
Soviet trade. Government support in Canada 
for exports to developed countries is assigned 
to three agencies: the Canadian Commercial 
Corporation (CCC), the Export Development 
Corporation (EDC), and the Department of Ex-
ternal Mfairs (DEA). 
The principal function of the CCC, a gov-
ernment-owned Crown Corporation, is to de-
velop contracts with governments and non-
government organizations, such as the United 
Nations (1986 Export Canada, p. 94). There are 
considerable advantages of CCC involvement 
for importers of Canadian goods which should 
be made known to the Sovi~ts. These advan-
tages include CCC assurance of the technical 
and financial capabilities of suppliers; the con-
venience of a single point-of-contact agency 
for multiple-item purchases; the ease of deal-
ing on a government-to-government basis; and 
the confidence of knowing that they will enjoy 
the same level of purchasing services employed 
by the Government of Canada when it pur-
chases for its own account. 
The goal of the Export Development Cor-
poration, also a Crown Corporation, is to pro-
mote Canadian exports by providing insurance, 
guarantee, and loan facilities (1986 Export 
Canada, p. 105). The most important feature of 
EDC activities with respect to the Soviet Union 
is its financing of Soviet purchases of Canadian 
goods. In order to qualify for EDC financing, 
the exporter must show that the Canadian con-
tent of the exports meets "the achievable level." 
This required level of Canadian content varies 
from product to product so the EDC provides 
advice to exporters to help them meet mini-
mum Canadian content requirements. 
Since 1976, all EDC financing of Soviet 
purchases has been directed towards industrial 
exports. Given this focus on industrial exports, 
the EDC should be considered an important 
ingredient in any marketing strategy for further 
increasing industrial exports to the USSR Prior 
to the 1979 invasion of Mghanistan, the USSR 
had a $500 million line-of-credit from the EDC, 
which was terminated by the government soon 
thereafter and not reinstated until 1985. In-
dustrial exporting objectives obviously "bit the 
bullet" in this choice between economic gain 
and international political goals, as further evi-
denced by the complete absence of EDC fi-
nancing activity with the USSR in 1981, 1982, 
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and 1985. 
The Department of External Mfairs was 
created in 1982 as a result of the reorganization 
of the now-defunct Department of Industry, 
Trade, and Commerce. The DEA is responsible 
for finding international markets for Canadian 
manufactured goods, resource products, and 
services (1986 Export Canada, p. 94). In recent 
years the Trade Committee of the DEA has dis-
cussed the importance of East-West trade is-
sues and has conducted high-level reviews of 
bilateral trade relations and trade con-
sultations with the Soviets (DEA Annual Re-
port, pp. 8, 30). The DEAAgriculture, Fish, and 
. Food Products Bureau has also sponsored a 
mission to the USSR to increase sales of her-
ring and frozen groundfish (DEA Annual Re-
port, p. 10). In May 1984, a new fisheries treaty 
was signed with the USSR, which strength-
ened Canada's management of the 200-mile 
economic zone and for the first time included a 
Soviet commitment to purchase Canadian proc-
essed fish (DEAAnnual Report, p. 30). 
Putting the sanctions of the early Mghan-
istan invasion years in the past, Canada is cur-
rently seeking more industrial exports to the 
USSR In February 1986, commenting on an $8 
million sale of Canadian pumps for a Soviet 
coal slurry pipeline, DEA Minister James F. 
Kelleher stated, "This export to the USSR sup-
ports the government's strategy of expanding 
Canadian marketing and sales efforts in sectors 
such as energy while maintaining our grains 
market" (DEAPress Release, February 27, 1986). 
Public Policy Options 
Canada's government agencies are well 
structured to further develop Soviet markets. 
This section will discuss some of the ways in 
which Canada might, without any major or-
ganizational changes, expand sales of Cana-
dian products and services to each of the nine 
USSR sectors noted previously. 
Trade officials of the DEA and the CCC 
who are responsible for developing Canadian-
Soviet trade might become more effective by 
developing closer working relationships with 
the Canadian-East European Trade Council. 
Many of the Trade Council's member firms (53, 
not including industry organizations such as 
the Canadian Export Association) are inter-
ested in the Soviet Market. The Department of 
External Mfairs' USSR and Eastern European 
Trade Development Division (hereafter the 
DEA-USSR) might maintain a file of Canadian 
firms interested in doing business with the 
USSR. Each of these firms could · provide the 
DEA-USSR with detailed descriptions of the 
products or services which they seek to export 
to the Soviets. On the opposite side of the coin, 
DEA-USSR officials could develop closer busi-
ness relations with officials of the appropriate 
Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs), 
with Soviet managers who will be seeking im-
ports through the FTOs, and with the man-
agers' representatives in the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (e.g., senior officials of the Import Ad-
ministration for Industrial Raw Materials, Food, 
and Finished Goods). 
Because the Soviet system restricts the 
individual's choice of occupation, one can ex-
pect to be dealing with the same person in the 
same office much more than in the West. 
Therefore, it is important to cultivate an "old-
boy" network in the FTOs and in the ministries 
behind them which are responsible for buying 
the products which Canada wants to sell to the 
Soviets. In this way the D EA or CCC will be well 
positioned to act both as a promoter and as a 
"listening post" for Canadian exporters. 
It also might prove useful for DEA-USSR 
officials to maintain closer relations with So-
viet companies in Canada. According to the 
East- West Business Directory, there are five 
such companies in Canada whose controlling 
shareholders are Soviet FTOs. Among other 
activities, these five companies and/ or their 
parent FTOs are involved in importing the fol-
lowing items: ships; industrial licenses; tech-
nological know-how; plywood; hardboard; pulp; 
sulpher; aircraft engines and parts; welding 
machinery; metal-cutting machine tools; wood-
working machine tools; complete plants and 
individual equipment for chemical and pet-
rochemical industries; and road-building ma-
chinery. One of the advantages of working 
closely with the FTOs is that the DEA-USSR 
will be more knowledgeable regarding the bet-
ter Soviet products and companies. The DEA-
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USSR will then be better situated to arrange 
more beneficial "countertrade" deals, a form of 
barter which is a favorite Soviet trading method. 
Another advantage of a close working relation-
ship with Soviet companies in Canada is that 
Soviet companies abroad report on technical 
and commercial developments in the West and 
can strongly influence the purchasing deci-
sions of the FTOs, sometimes acting as pur-
chasing agents for parent FTOs (East- West 
Business Directory, pp. 1-02, 1-03). Therefore, 
an effective export strategy might be for the 
DEA-USSR to encourage Canadian companies 
interested in the Soviet market to ensure that 
the relevant Soviet-owned companies regu-
larly receive accurate product information. 
The DEA-USSR might also consider edu-
cating interested Canadian companies on the 
advantages of participating in joint companies 
with the Soviets. One potential benefit of form-
ing a joint company in the USSR is increased 
Soviet purchases of the Canadian firm's prod-
ucts, a benefit which derives from the Canadian 
firm's contribution to increasing Soviet hard-
currency sales in Western markets. Participa-
tion in a joint company may also offer the 
Canadian firm preferential access to Soviet 
products, leverage over Soviet suppliers, and 
increased control over quality and product de-
livery schedules with respect to countertrade 
deals (East- West Business Directory, p. 1-04). 
The DEA-USSR could also undertake to 
educate Canadian trading houses seeking to 
export to the USSR. Traders will need to be able 
to deal with the Soviet government. This abil-
ity requires knowledge of the laws, and the for-
mal and informal procedures for importing and 
exporting; understanding of Soviet priorities 
in trade; and good relationships with govern-
ment officials (Kelly & Lecraw, p. 38). Effective 
trading houses can be quite useful in expand-
ing exports to the Soviets because they can 
provide advisory services, insurance services, 
and economies of scale to both the buyer and 
seller. Some experts feel that the skill of Cana-
dian trading houses in dealing with demands 
for countertrade will be increasingly crucial in 
the years ahead (Kelly & Lecraw, p. 39). The 
DEA-USSRshould therefore do its best to equip 
Canada's trading houses with the necessary 
tools for dealing with the USSR. 
Perhaps the strongest marketing effort 
Canada can make in the Soviet market is one 
which will promote those Canadian products 
and services which will in tum enhance Soviet 
exports. The Soviets have made it clear that 
they are reluctant to significantly increase their 
debt to the West. In fact, in 1977 the Soviets 
chose to curtail imports rather than increase 
their debt to the West, despite Western willing-
ness to extend further credits (Schroeder, 
p. 65).This means that there are only two ways 
that Canada can increase its exports to the 
Soviets. One way is to promote the substitution 
of Canadian products for products currently 
exported to the USSR by other countries. This 
would require that Canadian industry offer 
products and services of quality comparable to 
those of other international competitors with 
more competitive pricing and financing. Al-
though recent exchange rate movements in-
crease the price competitiveness of Canadian 
exports vis-a-vis those of most other OECD 
countries, it would not be wise to depend on 
favorable foreign exchange markets as the 
foundation of an export policy. Exchange rate 
markets are quite volatile and are subject to 
political and economic considerations far greater 
in scope than a trade promotion effort aimed at 
one country. With regard to price competitive-
ness, Canadian industry is disadvantaged by its 
tax system. Although the Japanese, for exam-
ple, are able to remove the value-added tax 
component from the price of their exports, the 
tax component of a Canadian export cannot be 
taken out. The price competitiveness of Cana-
dian products, therefore, is a significant con-
sideration but it is not specific to the Canadian-
Soviet question. All in all, it would be very dif-
ficult for the government to undertake an effort 
to increase exports to the USSR by focusing on 
improving price competitiveness. 
Similarly, more competitive financing, 
while desirable, is not the most feasible ap-
proach to increasing exports to the USSR un-
der Canada's current export financing system. 
The export financing of Canada's exporters and 
bankers has long lacked the aggressiveness of 
her major European and Japanese competitors 
(Emery, p. 99). This is particularly true with res-
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pect to short-term export financing and gov-
ernment-supported export financing. Not only 
does Canada's short-term export financing 
currently not match the terms of its com-
petitors, but it is not likely to soon (Conference 
Board, p. 85). Canadian bankers have not devel-
oped the range of short-term export financing 
services that European and Japanese bankers 
have, possibly due to the fact that almost 70% 
of Canada's exports go to the U.S. (Conference 
Board, pp. 89-91). Some exporters have said 
that subsidized interest rates from banks would 
be beneficial, but this policy would be dis-
criminatory and costly and is not expected to 
develop (Conference Board, p. 85). 
The situation in long-term, commercial 
export financing in Canada is more promising. 
According toR. G. Styles, Executive Vice Presi-
dent of World Trade and Merchant Banking at 
the Royal Bank of Canada, Canada's long-term 
export financing rates and terms "are every bit 
as competitive as those ... our trade com-
petitors have acquired through their commer-
cial banking systems" (Conference Board, 
p. 86). However,govemment-supported financ-
ing does not match the terms of other coun-
tries' arrangements (Conference Board, p.102). 
Budget constraints at the EDC have limited 
the availability of public funds to alleviate this 
problem. Furthermore, according to Sylvain 
Cloutier, Chairman of the Board and President 
ofthe EDC, "It is not possible in any significant 
degree over the long term to buy exports with 
cheap export financing. Such tactics are 
quickly matched by competitors" (Conference 
Board, p. 95). 
If an effort to convince the Soviets to 
purchase more Canadian goods is going to be 
successful, the Soviets must be convinced that 
their purchases of Canadian goods will result 
in a reciprocal increase in the USSR's own 
exports. There are two simple means by which 
the Soviets may be assured of their ability to 
pay for Canadian purchases: by barter and by 
counterpurchase transactions. In a simple 
counterpurchase transaction, a Soviet com-
pany would, using Western credit, buy Cana-
dian plant and equipment. The Canadian 
company would agree to purchase Soviet goods, 
the income from which would be used to retire 
the Soviet debt. Barter and counterpurchase 
arrangements can be altered by involving third 
parties to handle the acceptance and resale of 
the Soviet goods. Engaging a trading firm to fill 
this third-party role can accomplish significant 
economies of scale, making such a transaction 
worthwhile to a Canadian firm that does not 
have an in-house international trading group. 
Of course, the Soviet exports generated by 
Canadian sales to the USSR need not be mar-
keted in Canada. Instead, the Soviet goods 
which the Canadian firm agrees to purchase 
can be chosen for either re-export or for direct 
delivery to .a trading house of a third country. 
Effective trading of this nature would not only 
increase Canadian exports, but it would also 
satisfy the USSR by finding export markets for 
Soviet products and by protecting the Soviets 
from further indebtedness. 
There are certainly problems related to 
the above two trading methods. One of the 
most significant problems is that aside from 
natural resources, the Soviets have little to 
offer Western markets, a fact evidenced by the 
less-than-four percent share of manufactured 
goods in the USSR's hard-currency earnings 
("Venturing Jointly into the Russian Unknown," 
p. 67). However, inexpensive, lower-technol-
ogy Soviet products may be suitable for re-
export to Third World countries whose limited 
import budgets do not allow for the purchase of 
more advanced and expensive Canadian 
products. 
In addition to barter and counterpurchase 
agreements, there is a third method which can 
help to eliminate the problem of choosing which 
Soviet goods to agree to purchase. This method 
is the compensation agreement. A compensa-
tion agreement is similar to a counterpurchase 
agreement, with the difference that the prod-
ucts which the Canadian firm agrees to buy are 
generated by the sale of Canadian capital 
equipment. For instance, a Canadian manufac-
turer of metalworking machinery would export 
machinery to the Soviets, with credit arranged 
by the EDC or a Canadian bank. The Canadian 
firm would then purchase Soviet metal prod-
ucts manufactured with the Canadian machin-
ery. This trading method possesses all the 
benefits of both barter and counterpurchase 
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transactions. In addition, it develops new or 
improved Soviet products which should be 
easier to resell (or re-export). The main prob-
lem currently with this trading method is the 
quality control of the Soviet-produced prod-
uct. Hopefully, Gorbachev's planned reforms 
will eliminate this problem by allowing more 
Western involvement in Soviet-Western eco-
nomic cooperation agreements. 
Canada has clearly been ambitious in its 
pursuit of the short-term market for Soviet 
food needs. The USSR is the largest importer of 
Canadian grain. In May 1984 the DEA negoti-
ated an agreement which resulted in the first 
Soviet commitment to purchase Canadian proc-
essed fish products. The DEA's Agriculture, 
Food, and Fish Products Bureau promotes 
Canadian food producers' interests in the So-
viet market. The DEA's Program for Export 
Market Development also assists in the devel-
opment of export markets for Canadian food 
products. Assistance provided by this program 
may cover capital or operating costs for special 
production, handling, storage, or technical 
promotion facilities. Long term market devel-
opment plans and projects including generic 
promotion, establishment of overseas rep-
resentation, as well as technical training of 
individuals from customer countries, may also 
be eligible for government support under this 
program. Canada should certainly continue its 
successful efforts to market food to the Soviets. 
However, Canada's lack of competitive short-
term financing may still serve to limit her abil-
ity to satisfy short-term needs created by short-
ages in the Soviet system in those markets, like 
grain, in which the USSR is offered little choice 
among suppliers. 
Conclusions 
Returning to the opening questions of 
this paper, it is now possible to draw some 
definitive conclusions. There are substantial 
unexploited opportunities for Canada in the 
Soviet market. In the short-term markets, how-
ever, Canadian exporters are hampered by the 
relative weakness of both EDC and private short-
term export financing institutions. Canada does 
compete effectively in the short-term markets 
for food, and government policies and pro-
grams have supported this effort. Matching 
Canadian resources to Soviet needs, one may 
conclude that the most accessible oppor-
tunities in the Soviet market for Canada are in 
the capital goods market. Counterpurchase 
agreements and, to an even greater extent, 
compensation agreements are particularly well-
suited to the export of capital goods. The na-
ture of these agreements requires medium to 
long-term financing, an area where Canadian 
private banking is internationally competitive. 
As pointed out earlier in the paper, Canada has 
the capacity to export capital goods and the 
productivity of Soviet capital is not what the 
Soviets wish it to be. Imports will, to a still 
uncertain degree, be necessary to remedy this 
Soviet problem. 
In the longer term markets for industrial 
goods and capital equipment, Canada has shown 
some successes but there is still room for im-
provement. One area in which the Canadian 
government may be able to improve the Cana-
dian -Soviet export effort is that of the effective 
collection and transmission of information about 
products from Canadian producers to Soviet 
consumers at every level, from the Soviet com-
panies in Canada to senior Ministry of Trade 
officials in Moscow. Other areas include en-
couraging among trade officials and private 
individuals with trading interests the develop-
ment of the skills and knowledge necessary to 
negotiate mutually profitable transactions with 
officials of command economies. 
This paper has not discussed the means 
which Canada employs to provide information 
to Soviet FTOs. The DEA's agreement with the 
Soviets concerning Soviet purchases of proc-
essed fish may be taken as one example of the 
government's ability to market effectively to a 
Soviet FrO. Industrial markets, however, re-
quire more complicated information flows. 
Canada must work to carry over the success 
which she has enjoyed in the short-term agri-
cultural markets into the longer term indus-
trial markets. The only recent Canadian policy 
which seems to have hindered Canada's indus-
trial exporters in the area of Soviet trade has 
been the official reaction to the invasion of 
Mghanistan; but Canadian-Soviet trade is def-
initely subject to political considerations. The 
termination of the Soviets' credit line and the 
drastic decline in EDC-supported industrial 
exports to the Soviet Union clearly illustrate 
this fact. Although roughly doubling her grain 
sales to the USSR after the invasion, Canada 
has withheld support for industrial exports. 
There is no way of knowing how damaging this 
action has been to industrial exporters to the 
Soviet Union. A more useful response might 
have been to hold grain sales to their then-
current or legal minimum level while quietly 
maintaining the status quo in support of in-
dustrial exports. 
In general, though, Canada has so far 
shown an ability to market her goods suc-
cessfully in the USSR. It is to be hoped that 
such successes will continue to multiply in the 
future, especially in the relatively unexploited 
Soviet market for capital goods. 
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